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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT - PARTICULAR GROUNDS FOR 
DISCHARGE: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT DRAWS THE LINE FOR 
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE NLRB 




In MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held 
that MikLin Enterprises, owner of ten Jimmy John’s franchise restaurants, 
did not violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act when it dis-
charged several employees for protest activities related to an ongoing labor 
dispute.  In March 2011, MikLin employees placed posters around the Twin 
Cities insinuating MikLin forced its employees to work while sick and that 
the company’s sick leave policy endangered the health of its customers.  As 
a result, MikLin terminated the employees who organized the poster cam-
paign and reprimanded several others.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
explained that the employees’ actions were disloyal and calculated to harm 
MikLin’s reputation, and therefore Section 7 did not protect the poster cam-
paign. In disagreeing with the decision of the NLRB, the court highlighted a 
critical tension point between administrative agencies and the judiciary as 
interpreters of law.  Also of practical significance, the court adopted a narrow 
view of Section 7, imparting considerable latitude for North Dakota employ-
ers to terminate employees engaged in labor-related protest activities.  More-
over, this decision exacerbates a previously brewing split among the federal 
circuit courts of appeals, meaning North Dakota practitioners should remain 
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I. FACTS 
MikLin Enterprises, Inc. (“MikLin”) owns and operates ten Jimmy 
John’s sandwich restaurants in the Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota 
(“Twin Cities”) area.1  Michael Mulligan serves as MikLin’s president and 
his son, Robert, serves as the company’s vice president.2  The dispute that 
brought about this case began in 2007, when a group of MikLin employees 
attempted to unionize under the banner of the Industrial Workers of the 
World (“IWW”) labor organization.3  
Supporters of the IWW initially ventured to win seats on MikLin’s Board 
of Directors, but failed.4  Following its first unsuccessful attempt to influence 
the direction of the company, the IWW focused its attention on MikLin’s sick 
leave policy, beginning in early 2011.5  When the IWW campaign started, 
MikLin’s policy required sick employees to find a replacement, with failure 
to follow the policy resulting in termination.6  In response to the policy, a 
group of employees created posters with pictures of two identical Jimmy 
John’s sandwiches side by side.7  Above one picture, the first caption read in 
all capital letters, “your sandwich made by a healthy Jimmy John’s worker,” 
with the other caption reading, “your sandwich made by a sick Jimmy John’s 
Worker.”8  The poster continued, “Can’t tell the difference? That’s too bad 
because Jimmy John’s workers don’t get paid sick days. Shoot, we can’t even 
call in sick.”9  The flyer ominously concluded, “We hope your immune sys-
tem is ready because you’re about to take the sandwich test.”10  
Employees sympathetic to the union began their campaign in March 
2011 by posting the flyers on bulletin boards in MikLin-owned Jimmy John’s 
restaurants, which store managers promptly removed.11  The employees be-
lieved March was an appropriate time to initiate the campaign because it was 
flu season.12  On March 10, 2011, union supporters issued a press release to 
 
1. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. The IWW filed an unfair labor practices complaint against MikLin because of the Board 
of Directors election. Id. The parties eventually settled their dispute, agreeing in January 2011 to 
conduct a new Board of Directors election if the IWW chose to file for a rerun election. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 815. 





12. Id. at 815. 
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more than one hundred local and national news outlets, threatening to distrib-
ute thousands of posters around the Twin Cities if MikLin did not change its 
sick leave policy.13  Management responded, meeting with organizers of the 
campaign later that day and posting a new sick leave policy the following 
week.14  
The new policy established a points system, whereby MikLin would al-
low an employee to miss between two and four days of work without finding 
a replacement before facing termination.15  The policy also reiterated that 
MikLin prohibited employees experiencing flu-like symptoms from working 
until twenty-four hours after they became symptom-free.16 
Not satisfied with the new sick leave policy, union supporters acted on 
their previous threat, posting flyers around the Twin Cities near MikLin-
owned stores.17  The second wave of posters added one line that included 
Robert Mulligan’s personal phone number, urging the public to “let him 
know you want healthy workers making your sandwich.”18  In response, man-
agement terminated six of the poster campaign organizers and sent written 
warnings to three other employees.19  As a result, the IWW filed unfair labor 
practices complaints against MikLin with the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB” or “Board”).20 
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) heard arguments in the dispute 
and issued an order on April 20, 2012, finding that MikLin violated 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1).21  The ALJ, adhering to NLRB administrative precedent, found 
that the posters were intricately related to an ongoing labor dispute, and there-
fore, fell within the protection of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” 
 
13. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 816. The press release also asserted MikLin restaurants violated state 
health codes daily. Id. While MikLin restaurants had twice been cited for health code violations 
likely resulting from ill employees over the course of 10 years, no evidence supported the contention 
that health code violations frequently occurred at MikLin restaurants. Id.  
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 816-17. Employees received zero points if they found a replacement. Id. However, 
if employees were unable to find a replacement, they received one point if they notified management 
more than an hour before their shift, two points if they notified management less than an hour before 
their shift, and three points if they failed to notify management. Id. Management would terminate 
employees who accumulated four points. Id.  
16. Id. at 817. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. Robert Mulligan testified that because of the poster campaign, he became inundated 
with angry calls to his personal phone. Id.  
19. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 817. 
20. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 818 F.3d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 2016), rev’d in part en banc, 
861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017).  
21. MikLin Enter., Inc., 2012 WL 1387939 (2012), adopted as modified 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27 
(2014).  
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or “Act”).22  Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that while the protestors’ as-
sertion they could not call in sick was “not literally true,” it constituted “pro-
tected hyperbole.”23  
The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s order in a 2-1 decision on August 21, 
2014.24  A majority of Board members found the union supporters’ state-
ments were not maliciously untrue, and thus, were not so disloyal as to lose 
the Act’s protection.25  In dissent, however, one Board member argued the 
protestors’ statements were materially false and calculated to harm MikLin’s 
reputation, concluding MikLin therefore had cause to fire the six employees 
for disloyalty.26 
A similar split occurred on appeal to a three-judge panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In relation to the poster cam-
paign, MikLin argued the NLRA did not protect the protestors’ activities be-
cause:  (1) union supporters’ statements were either false or showed a reck-
less disregard for the truth; or, alternatively, (2) the poster campaign 
constituted disloyal conduct.27  A 2-1 majority of the panel rejected MikLin’s 
arguments and enforced the order of the Board.28  Judge Loken, in dissent, 
presented similar arguments to the dissenting NLRB member, and would 
have found that MikLin did not violate the Act when it fired the six employ-
ees.29  Following the panel’s decision, MikLin filed a motion for rehearing 
en banc, which the court granted on June 22, 2016.30 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A federal court of appeals can decline to enforce an NLRB order if the 
Board misapplies the law, or if substantial evidence does not support the 
Board’s decision.31  A critical tension point in the National Labor Relations 
Act is the dichotomy between Section 7,32 which protects employees’ rights 
 
22. Id. 
23. Id. The ALJ further reasoned that the employees’ contention regarding frequent health 
code violations also stretched the truth, but remained protected because the statement pointed out 
the basic argument that MikLin’s sick leave policy could result in customers becoming ill. Id. 
24. MikLin Enter., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 10 (2014).  
25. Id. at 6-8. 
26. Id. at 12 (Johnson, M., dissenting in part).  
27. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 818 F.3d 397, 406-07 (8th Cir. 2016), rev’d in part en banc, 
861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017).  
28. Id. at 408. 
29. Id. at 414 (Loken, J., dissenting in part). 
30. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, No: 14-3099, 2016 WL 4651405 (8th Cir. Jun. 22, 2016). 
31. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
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to collectively bargain, and Section 10(c),33 which upholds the right of em-
ployers to terminate employees for cause.  The United States Supreme Court 
addressed this apparent quandary in its 1953 Jefferson Standard decision, 
holding that employers may discharge employees engaged in labor-related 
protest activities for cause when the employees’ actions constitute disloy-
alty.34  Moreover, in addition to labor and employment law considerations, 
federal appellate courts reviewing decisions of the NLRB must remain aware 
of administrative law principles, namely deference to an administrative 
agency’s interpretation of a statute under Chevron and its progeny.35 
A. TENSION POINT: SECTIONS 7 AND 10(C) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT 
From the inception of the organized labor movement in the Nineteenth 
Century, unions have sought protection from employer retaliation for mem-
bers participating in labor disputes.  Congress codified labor’s concerns into 
law in 1935 with the passage of the NLRA.36  Specifically, Section 7 of the 
Act, designated as 29 U.S.C. § 157, protects the rights of employees to col-
lectively bargain and organize.37  Section 7 states, in relevant part, “Employ-
ees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining.”38  Significantly, Section 7 protects not only members 
of labor unions, but also those supporting a labor union’s activities.39  Section 
8(a)(1) of the Act further directs the NLRB to hold employers engaged in 
restricting Section 7 rights accountable for maintaining unfair labor prac-
tices.40  The protections of Section 7 are not absolute, however.41  
 
33. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012). 
34. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, 364 U.S. 464 (1953).  
35. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012). 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
38. Id. 
39. Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Ac-
tivity under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 790 (1989). 
40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). 
41. See e.g. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 254 (1939) (holding em-
ployee seizure of factory during strike constituted unlawful activity and proper grounds for dis-
charge); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 537 F.2d 950, 956 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding employee disclo-
sure of confidential company information during union organizing campaign provided grounds for 
discharge). 
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The NLRB and federal courts have established exceptions that curtail 
employee rights to collectively bargain and support union activity.42  The 
most frequent exception to Section 7 derives from Section 10(c) of the 
NLRA, which retains the right of employers to terminate employees for 
cause.43  The statute reads, “No order of the Board shall require the reinstate-
ment of any individual as an employee . . . if such individual was suspended 
or discharged for cause.”44  
The apparent clash between Sections 7 and 10(c) of the NLRA has pro-
vided fertile ground for litigation.45  This includes not only administrative 
bodies, but also the federal circuit courts of appeals, to which litigants may 
directly appeal orders of the Board.46  Courts first must determine whether 
the activity falls within Section 7 protection, and then discern whether an 
administrative or judicial exception precludes application of Section 7.47 
As Professor Branscomb explained, the Board and courts initially re-
served exceptions under Section 10(c) for blatant insubordination, hijacking 
an employer’s means of production, or other “indefensible” employee ac-
tions.48  However, the United States Supreme Court significantly expanded 
the scope of Section 7 exceptions with its 1953 Jefferson Standard decision.49 
B. JEFFERSON STANDARD AND THE EMPLOYEE DISLOYALTY TEST 
The United States Supreme Court tackled the dichotomy between Sec-
tions 7 and 10(c) of the NLRA in its National Labor Relations Board v. Local 
Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“Jeffer-
son Standard”)50 decision.51  In Jefferson Standard, employees organized un-
der a chapter of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers entered 
into negotiations to form a collective bargaining agreement with their em-
ployer, Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company.52  The company and the 
 
42. Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73 B.U. L. REV. 
291, 298 (1993). 
43. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012).  
44. Id. 
45. Fischl, supra note 39, at 789-90.  
46. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2012). 
47. Branscomb, supra note 42, at 310-11.  
48. Id. at 299-300. 
49. Id. at 300. 
50. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). The 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers represented employees of Jefferson Standard 
Broadcasting Co. in the labor dispute that led to the NLRB action. Id. The case is referred to com-
monly as Jefferson Standard. 
51. Id. at 475.  
52. Id. at 467. 
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union disagreed as to whether an employee had an automatic right to arbitra-
tion upon termination, or if the company could first determine whether the 
termination necessitated arbitration.53  As a result, several employees formed 
a picket line outside of regular work hours to protest the company’s handling 
of the labor negotiations.54  Several employees soon grew impatient with this 
strategy, however, and distributed more than 5000 handbills criticizing Jef-
ferson Standard’s broadcasting business.55  The handbills did not mention the 
labor dispute between the union employees and the broadcasting company.56  
As a result, the company terminated ten employees responsible for distrib-
uting or sponsoring the handbills.57  
Justice Burton, writing for a 6-3 majority, reasoned the handbills consti-
tuted “a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality of the company’s 
product and its business policies, in a manner reasonably calculated to harm 
the company’s reputation and reduce its income.”58  The Court also noted the 
attack came at “a critical time in the initiation of the company’s television 
service.”59  The Court further explained the employee’s disloyal actions pro-
vided grounds for the company to discharge them under Section 10(c).60  Ac-
cordingly, the Court held the NLRB could not reinstate the terminated em-
ployees because the broadcasting company properly discharged the 
employees for cause.61 
The dissent countered that the majority’s new disloyalty principle evis-
cerated Section 7 rights.62  Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Black and 
Douglas, argued that interpreting Section 10(c) to include discharge for dis-
loyalty was inconsistent with Congress’ intent in passing the NLRA.63  Jus-
tice Frankfurter asserted, “Many of the legally recognized tactics and weap-
ons of labor would readily be condemned for ‘disloyalty’ were they 
employed between man and man in friendly personal relations.”64  The dis-
sent also contended the Jefferson Standard disloyalty test would not be of 
use to future courts and should be confined to the facts of the case.65 
 
53. Id. 
54. Id.  
55. Id. at 468.  
56. Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. at 468. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 471. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 472. 
61. Id. at 477. 
62. Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. at 479 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
63. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
64. Id. at 479–80. 
65. Id. at 481. 
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Despite Justice Frankfurter’s reservations about the future applicability 
of Jefferson Standard, the disloyalty principle remains a core exception to 
Section 7 protection.  Since the 1953 decision, the NLRB has developed the 
disloyalty principle “considerably.”66  The Board clearly laid out the modern 
disloyalty standard in its own MikLin decision when it stated, “To lose the 
Act’s protection as an act of disloyalty, an employee’s public criticism of an 
employer must evidence a malicious motive.”67  The Board further articu-
lated, “[E]ven communications that raise highly sensitive issues such as pub-
lic safety [are] protected where they are sufficiently linked to a legitimate 
labor dispute and are not maliciously motivated to harm the employer.”68  
Thus, today's circuit courts of appeals are faced with determining whether the 
Board’s malicious motive test can be reconciled with Jefferson Standard.69 
C. CHEVRON AND BRAND X: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
Federal appellate courts also must remain vigilant for bedrock principles 
of administrative law when reviewing NLRB orders.  In its landmark Chev-
ron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.70 decision, the 
Supreme Court articulated the modern standard for judicial deference to the 
statutory interpretation of an administrative agency.71  In Chevron, the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council challenged an Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) rule that interpreted the term “stationary source” in the con-
text of the Clean Air Act.72  Significantly, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit found no Congressional intent existed as 
to the meaning of a “stationary source.”73  The appeals court nonetheless held 
the EPA stationary source rule was “inappropriate” in the context of the 
Clean Air Act based on the court’s own construction of the statute.74  
On appeal from the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court handed down a two-
part test for the judiciary to apply when confronted with a rulemaking 
 
66. MikLin Enter., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 6 n. 18 (2014). 
67. Id. at 5 (quoting Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1252 (2007). 
68. Id. at 6.  
69. Compare MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 821–22 (holding the NLRB’s reli-
ance on the malicious motive test impermissibly overruled Jefferson Standard) (8th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc), with DIRECTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 41–42 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (affirming the NLRB’s 
malicious motive standard). 
70. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 834, 837 (1984). 
71. Id. at 842-43.  
72. Id. at 840. 
73. Id. at 841. 
74. Id. 
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agency’s interpretation of a statute.75  First, if Congress has directly ad-
dressed an issue, both the judiciary and the bureaucracy must give effect to 
the express will of the legislative branch.76  Second, if Congress has not spo-
ken directly on an issue and an administrative agency has promulgated a rule 
on that issue, the judiciary is not permitted to impose its own construction of 
the statute that the administrative agency relied upon.77  Rather, the court’s 
task is to determine if the administrative agency’s rule is “based on a permis-
sible construction of the statute.”78  Relying on the two-part test, the Court 
explained that the D.C. Circuit erred when it struck down the EPA regulation 
as “inappropriate” absent specific congressional intent on the issue.79  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that the appeals court should not have imposed its 
own construction of the Clean Air Act, but rather determined whether the 
EPA’s interpretation of the Act was “reasonable.”80  Therefore, the high 
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and upheld the EPA rule.81 
Two decades later, the judiciary and bureaucracy again squared off in 
the Supreme Court, this time over whether an administrative agency is bound 
to follow a judicial interpretation of a statute.82  In National Cable & Tele-
communications Association v. Brand X Internet Service,83 the Court ad-
dressed a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) ruling determining 
whether broadband cable internet service constituted an “information ser-
vice,” a “telecommunications service,” or both, under the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1966.84  The FCC initially classified broadband providers as an 
“information service,” but not a “telecommunications service.”85  A flurry of 
litigation resulted as broadband providers sought classification as a “telecom-
munications service,” and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit took up consolidated appeals in the dispute.86  Rather than address the 
FCC ruling on Chevron grounds, the Ninth Circuit relied on its own prece-
dent to resolve the case, which held that cable modem providers were a “tel-
ecommunications service.”87 
 
75. Id. at 842. 
76. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
77. Id.  at 843. 
78. Id.  
79. Id. at 845. 
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 866. 
82. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 977. 
85. Id. at 977-78. 
86. Id. at 979. 
87. Id. at 979 (citing AT & T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-880 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court expanded on its Chevron 
decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.88  The Court deter-
mined, “Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously 
forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the 
agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”89  The Court ex-
plained the principle originated from Chevron because Congress explicitly 
delegated authority to promulgate rules emanating from federal statutes to 
administrative agencies.90  Therefore, the Court held the Ninth Circuit erred 
in overruling the FCC based on its own precedent, and instead should have 
deferred to the reasonable construction of the statute the FCC relied upon.91 
Finally, while courts typically defer to an agency’s construction of a stat-
ute, the judiciary has remained hesitant to enforce orders of the NLRB when 
doing so would result in the erosion of judicial precedent.92  Two Supreme 
Court cases illustrate this trend.  In Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board,93 the Court refused to enforce an order of the Board that at-
tempted to morph a long-held judicial rule into a multi-factor balancing test.94  
The crux of the Court’s reasoning was that adoption of the NLRB’s test 
would have “significantly erod[ed]” prior caselaw.95  Likewise, in National 
Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoreman’s Association,96 the 
high Court remanded a labor dispute for further fact finding because the 
Board “misconstrued” the Supreme Court’s caselaw regarding whether a type 
of labor could be the subject of a work preservation agreement.97  Thus, when 
reviewing decisions of the NLRB, federal appellate courts must consider not 
only labor and employment law, but also administrative law and the role of 
the judiciary in the federal system. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,98 Judge 
Loken, writing for the majority, reasoned that the Industrial Workers of the 
 
88. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982. 
89. Id. at 982-83. 
90. Id. at 983.  
91. Id. at 984. 
92. See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); NLRB v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 
473 U.S. 61 (1985). 
93. Id.  
94. Id. at 538. 
95. Id. 
96. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 473 U.S. at 61.  
97. Id. at 80. 
98. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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World supporters’ activities were disloyal and calculated to harm MikLin’s 
reputation.99  Furthermore, the majority found that Chevron did not apply 
because Jefferson Standard unambiguously interpreted Section 7 to require 
the reasonably calculated to harm test, which the Board improperly discarded 
when it focused instead on its own malicious motive test.100  In dissent, Judge 
Kelly argued that the court should have afforded the NLRB deference under 
Chevron, and that Jefferson Standard did not apply.101 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Judge Loken, writing for the majority after dissenting from the Eighth 
Circuit’s first MikLin decision, began the court’s analysis by refuting the dis-
sent’s contention that Jefferson Standard did not apply because the posters 
referenced a labor dispute.102  Next, the court explained the NLRB implicitly 
and improperly overruled Jefferson Standard when it employed its own sub-
jective malicious motive test, rather than the Supreme Court’s objective “rea-
sonably calculated to harm” test.103  The court proceeded to reject the dis-
sent’s second argument, that Chevron and Brand X required the court to defer 
to the decision of the NLRB, on the grounds that Jefferson Standard required 
the Board to apply an objective disloyalty test.104  Finally, relying on the 
court’s interpretation of Jefferson Standard, the court reasoned the IWW sup-
porters’ actions constituted unprotected disloyalty that fell outside of the pro-
tections of Section 7.105 
1. The NLRB misconstrued Jefferson Standard when it ignored the 
“reasonably calculated to harm” test in favor of its 
own precedent 
The majority first focused its attention on whether Jefferson Standard 
applied to the case.  The dissent argued that Jefferson Standard only applies 
when employees disparage an employer without reference to a labor dispute, 
and because the MikLin employees referenced sick leave in their posters, the 
decision did not apply.106  The majority refuted this position, however, rea-
soning that the Supreme Court upheld the Section 10(c) right of employers 
 
99.   Id. at 825. 
100. Id. at 823. 
101. Id. at 832, 835 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. at 820. 
103. Id. at 821. 
104. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 823. 
105. Id. at 824-25.  
106. Id. at 832 (Kelly, J., dissenting in part). 
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to terminate employees for disloyalty, even if that disloyalty presents itself 
in the context of a labor dispute.107  Specifically, the court referenced a pas-
sage from Jefferson Standard that stated the employees in that case would 
have lost Section 7 protection regardless of whether the actions constituted 
“concerted activity” within the meaning of the NLRA.108  Therefore, the ma-
jority concluded the disloyalty principle articulated in Jefferson Standard ap-
plied.109 
Next, the court addressed the NLRB’s interpretation of the Jefferson 
Standard disloyalty principle.  The court took issue with the NLRB’s deci-
sion to employ its own subjective test, which protected disloyal conduct un-
der Section 7 unless the employees’ actions evidenced a malicious motive.110  
The court explained that the Board misapplied Jefferson Standard in two 
ways.  First, the court found the Board essentially ignored the objective anal-
ysis required in Jefferson Standard, that being whether or not an employee’s 
actions were “reasonably calculated to harm” the employer.111  Second, the 
court reasoned that the Board’s malicious motive test impermissibly over-
ruled Jefferson Standard’s disloyalty test.112  The court pointed to the 
Board’s flawed reasoning that the MikLin employees’ actions may have 
harmed the reputation of the company, but that the actions were still protected 
because of the lack of malicious motive.113  The court explained the NLRB’s 
reasoning directly conflicted with Jefferson Standard because it disregarded 
the Supreme Court’s directive that conduct undertaken to advance a Section 
7 right could still constitute disloyalty.114  Accordingly, the court held the 
NLRB impermissibly overruled Jefferson Standard by relying on its own 
precedent and ignoring the “reasonably calculated to harm” test.115 
2. Jefferson Standard unambiguously interpreted Sections 7 and 
10(c), precluding Chevron deference to the NLRB 
The court next addressed whether Chevron and Brand X required defer-
ence to the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA.  First, the majority asserted 
 
107. Id. at 820 (citing NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 
464, 478 (1953)). 
108. Id. (citing Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. at 477-78). 
109. Id. at 821. 
110. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 821.  
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it was doubtful that Brand X applied to the case.116  The court reasoned the 
NLRB interpreted Jefferson Standard itself and did not create its own inter-
pretation of employee disloyalty under Section 10(c).117  The majority then 
explained Brand X did not require a court to defer to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of a judicial decision, but rather only to an agency’s reasonable interpre-
tation of a statute.118  Consequentially, the court determined it had the author-
ity to impose its own interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Jefferson Standard.119 
Second, and of primary importance, the court asserted the power of stat-
utory interpretation rests primarily with the judiciary.120  The court relied on 
Lechmere121 and International Longshoreman’s Association,122 explaining 
the Supreme Court previously refused to enforce NLRB orders that would 
have eroded judicial precedent.123  The court reasoned Jefferson Standard 
clearly established that disloyalty provided employers cause to fire employ-
ees under Section 10(c).124  This unambiguous interpretation of the Act pre-
cluded Chevron deference to the Board because the NLRB’s interpretation 
of Section 7 eroded the disloyalty principle articulated in Jefferson Stand-
ard.125  Therefore, the court determined the Board’s interpretation of Section 
7 was not entitled to Chevron deference.126 
3. The employee protest activities were so disloyal as to provide 
cause for MikLin to discharge them 
Finally, after ruling on the questions of law, the court addressed the mer-
its of the case.  Applying the court’s interpretation of Jefferson Standard, the 
majority reasoned the posters insinuated eating at a MikLin-owned restaurant 
would cause illness, which disparaged MikLin’s reputation.127  The court fur-
ther explained that allegations of serious health violations against a restaurant 
company constituted the “equivalent of a nuclear bomb,” and that MikLin’s 
employees intentionally played on this fear by choosing March as the time to 
 
116. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 823. 




121. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992). 
122. NLRB v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 473 U.S. 61, 80 (1985). 
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attack the company because of flu season.128  Critically, the court found the 
devastating nature of the employees’ attack against MikLin would outlive the 
labor dispute and damage the company’s reputation for maintaining clean 
establishments.129 
Furthermore, the court explained that the employees’ attacks against Mi-
kLin were “materially false and misleading.”130  The statement “we can’t 
even call in sick” presented on the posters was not based on fact, the court 
reasoned, and the protestors’ assertion that MikLin violated health codes 
every day was also misleading.131  Based on the falsehoods contained on the 
posters, the court contended the posters in MikLin made an even stronger case 
for disloyalty than the handbills in Jefferson Standard because the IBEW 
handbills asserted only facts about the company’s broadcasting business.132  
Therefore, the court found the employees’ disloyal actions fell outside of the 
protections of Section 7 and accordingly declined to enforce the NLRB’s or-
der in relevant part.133 
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
In dissent, Judge Kelly, joined by Judge Murphy, offered two primary 
arguments against the majority’s decision to partially decline to enforce the 
Board’s order.  First, she argued that Jefferson Standard did not apply be-
cause the attacks in MikLin referenced an ongoing labor dispute.134  Second, 
she contended the Board’s malicious motive test did not originate from Jef-
ferson Standard, and the court should have thus deferred to the NLRB’s in-





128. Id. (quoting Diamond Walnut Growers v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 1259, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
129. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 825. 
130. Id. (quoting St. Luke’s Presbyterian-Episcopal Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 575, 581 
(8th Cir. 2001)). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 826. The court enforced the remainder of the NLRB order, which found MikLin 
responsible for three other Section 7 violations. Id. The court held that posts on an anti-union Face-
book page by Robert Mulligan urging employees to remove posters around the Twin Cities violated 
the Act. Id. Second, posts by MikLin supervisors on the same page disparaging union supporters 
also violated the Act. Id. at 827. Finally, removal of union literature from MikLin stores at the 
request of management regarding a settlement reached on the initial Board of Directors election also 
violated Section 7. Id. at 828. 
134. Id. at 831 (Kelly, J., dissenting in part). 
135. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 835 (Kelly, J., dissenting in part). 
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1. Jefferson Standard should not apply when employee protest 
activities specifically reference an ongoing labor 
dispute 
Judge Kelly’s first argument centered around the Board’s decision to ap-
ply the employee disloyalty principle in Jefferson Standard.  She disagreed 
with the majority’s analysis, arguing Jefferson Standard left open the possi-
bility that Section 7 protected protest activities specifically related to ongoing 
labor disputes even when the employees’ actions were disloyal.136  The judge 
asserted that because the IWW posters clearly referenced the company’s sick 
leave policies, they were entitled to more protection than the handbills in Jef-
ferson Standard, which did not explicitly reference a labor dispute.137  Judge 
Kelly concluded Jefferson Standard did not foreclose the Board from finding 
explicit communications referencing an ongoing labor dispute as protected 
under Section 7, and thus argued the Board’s interpretation of the statute did 
not overrule Jefferson Standard.138 
2. The malicious motive test did not originate from Jefferson 
Standard, so the court should have given the Board’s 
interpretation of Section 7 deference 
Judge Kelly contended second that the court should have afforded Chev-
ron deference to the Board’s malicious motive test.  The majority discarded 
this argument because Jefferson Standard unambiguously foreclosed the 
NLRB’s ability to formulate a test that did not include the “reasonably cal-
culated to harm” standard.139  However, the dissent asserted the Jefferson 
Standard decision did not unambiguously interpret Section 7, and the Board 
was therefore free to formulate its own reasonable interpretation of the stat-
ute.140  Accordingly, the dissent pointed to Brand X and reasoned the admin-
istrative agency’s interpretation of the statute trumped the court’s interpreta-
tion.141  Judge Kelly believed the Board’s precedent was a reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous issue regarding Section 7, and the court 
should have therefore deferred to the NLRB malicious motive test.142 
 
136. Id. at 831. 
137. Id. at 832. 
138. Id. at 834. 
139. Id. at 824. 
140. Id. at 835. 
141. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 825. 
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IV. IMPACT 
MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board will have 
significant implications for labor and employment law as well as administra-
tive law in North Dakota.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision here 
creates precedent for the court to rely on in future disputes between employ-
ees engaged in labor-related protest activities and employers.  Additionally, 
the decision binds North Dakota federal district courts.  MikLin also deepens 
a split between the federal circuit courts of appeals regarding the validity of 
the NLRB’s malicious motive test.143  Most importantly, MikLin establishes 
firm guidelines in the Eighth Circuit for clashes between the judiciary and 
administrative agencies in their often-blurred roles as interpreters of law. 
A. EMPLOYERS GAINED MORE LATITUDE TO DISCHARGE EMPLOYEES 
FOR LABOR-RELATED PROTEST ACTIVITIES 
The Eighth Circuit’s MikLin decision constrains Section 7 employee 
protest rights and gives employers more latitude to discharge employees for 
cause under Section 10(c).  The decision allows employers to discharge em-
ployees whenever an employee attacks a company “in a manner reasonably 
calculated to harm the company’s reputation and reduce its income,” regard-
less of whether that employee is engaged in labor-related protest activities.144  
This could potentially result in a chilling effect for workers interested in join-
ing already struggling labor unions, which have notably dwindled in size and 
influence in the past three decades.145  Employees often face increased retal-
iation from their employers during labor disputes, and with the additional 
power of employers to terminate employees for disloyalty, potential members 
may be more hesitant to participate in or support unions.  
Furthermore, MikLin widens a split among the federal circuit courts of 
appeals, most recently between the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit.146  
Particularly, the two appellate courts disagree as to whether the NLRB’s ma-
licious motive test is consistent with Jefferson Standard.  While the MikLin 
 
143. Compare DIRECTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2016), with Sierra Pub. 
Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 220 (9th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Parr Lance Ambulance Serv., 723 F.2d 
575, 578 (7th Cir. 1983); Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1980); 
and Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 812, 814 (3d Cir. 1972). 
144. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 824-25. 
145. Megan Dunn & James Walker, Union Membership in the United States, Article in Spot-
light on Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Sept. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/spot-
light/2016/union-membership-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the number of employed union members decreased by 2.9 
million from 1983 to 2015. 
146. Compare MikLin, 861 F.3d at 821-22, with DIRECTV, 837 F.3d at 41-42. 
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court found the Board’s reliance on the malicious motive test improper, the 
court in DIRECTV did not question the Board’s use of the malicious motive 
test.147  Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, MasTec Advanced Technolo-
gies, co-petitioner in the DIRECTV case, filed a Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari to the United States Supreme Court.148  Almost immediately following 
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in MikLin, MasTec filed a supplemental brief in 
support of its petition.149 
In its supplemental brief, MasTec relied heavily on MikLin to urge the 
high Court to grant certiorari to resolve whether the NLRB’s malicious mo-
tive test comports with Jefferson Standard.150  The Board filed a brief in re-
sponse to MasTec’s arguments, distinguishing the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning 
from the D.C. Circuit’s.151  Most notably, the Board believed the Eighth Cir-
cuit overturned its MikLin ruling only because the Board failed to take the 
“reasonably calculated to harm” test into account, and not because of the ma-
licious motive standard itself.152  The Supreme Court ultimately denied Mas-
Tec’s petition on October 2, 2017.153  Accordingly, the question of whether 
the Board’s malicious motive test satisfies Jefferson Standard will remain 
open for the foreseeable future.  
Interestingly, the split among Eighth Circuit judges in the MikLin deci-
sions at both the panel and en banc level aligned with whether a Republican 
or Democrat president appointed the judge.154  The Republican appointees 
uniformly sided with MikLin, while the Democrat appointees dissented in 
favor of the employees.155  This split may become particularly relevant if the 
United States Supreme Court eventually grants a writ of certiorari to decide 
whether the malicious motive test comports with Jefferson Standard.156  With 
the recent confirmation of Neil Gorsuch as the Court’s fifth Republican-ap-
pointed justice, the Supreme Court may resolve the malicious motive issue 
along similar ideological lines.  In the meantime, North Dakota practitioners 
should remain acutely aware of the conflicting interpretations the courts of 
 
147. DIRECTV, 837 F.3d at 41-42. 
148. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, MasTec Advanced Tech. v. NLRB, 2017 WL 2179347 
(U.S. May 11, 2017) (No. 16-1370). 
149. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner, MasTec, (No. 16-1370), 2017 WL 3405613. 
150. Id. at *10. 
151. Supplemental Brief for Respondent, MasTec, (No. 16-1370), 2017 WL 3601392 at *22. 
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153. MasTec Advanced Tech. v. NLRB, (No. 16-1370), 2017 WL 2119340 at *1. 
154. Active and Senior Judges, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH 
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/active-and-senior-judges (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
155. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
156. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 148, at *i. 
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appeals have proffered on the malicious motive test and its clash with Jeffer-
son Standard. 
B. THE COURT’S NARROW VIEW OF CHEVRON AND BRAND X 
RESTRICTS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES’ ABILITY TO 
INTERPRET JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Finally, the MikLin decision represents the judiciary firmly staking its 
position as the final interpreter of the laws of the United States.  With the 
rising power of the federal bureaucracy, restraints on the authority of admin-
istrative agencies are more important than ever.157  As the federal government 
continues to grow, critical resolutions of disputes affecting millions of Amer-
icans are increasingly made not in the courtroom, but in quasi-judicial ad-
ministrative proceedings.158  While statutory law and judicial precedent su-
perficially bind these administrative agencies, courts must afford agency 
decisions wide latitude in the wake of Supreme Court decisions such as Chev-
ron and Brand X.159 
MikLin meaningfully restricts the power of administrative agencies to 
interpret judicial decisions.  Importantly, the decision reinforces the principle 
that the bureaucracy may not impose its own interpretation of statutes when 
that interpretation erodes judicial precedent.160  More significantly, the 
Eighth Circuit boldly asserted the Jefferson Standard decision unambigu-
ously foreclosed the ability of the NLRB to discard the “reasonably calcu-
lated to harm” test.161  The holding in MikLin therefore constrains the ability 
of an administrative agency to skirt around judicial precedent by relying 
solely on the agency’s own administrative precedent.   
The conflict between the judiciary and bureaucracy as interpreters of law 
on full display in MikLin has long been a source of tension in American gov-
ernment.  The ballooning of American bureaucracy directly threatens the 
constitutional balance of government, as evidenced by Chief Justice Roberts’ 
statement that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative 
state cannot be dismissed.”162  The Eighth Circuit’s decision in MikLin mo-
mentarily checks the bureaucracy, but the judiciary must continue to assert 
 




159. See MikLin, 861 F.3d at 832 (citations omitted) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (arguing Board 
interpretations of the NLRA are entitled to “considerable deference”). 
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161. Id. at 823. 
162. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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itself as the proper branch for interpreting the laws of the United States before 
it is swallowed whole. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down two holdings that will un-
doubtedly impact North Dakota practitioners.  First, the court found the Jef-
ferson Standard employee disloyalty test precluded the National Labor Re-
lations Board from relying solely on its own precedent requiring employees 
to evidence a malicious motive.163  Second, the court found Chevron defer-
ence did not apply to the NLRB’s malicious motive test because Jefferson 
Standard unambiguously interpreted the Act to require an objective test for 
employee disloyalty.164  Employers, labor unions, and attorneys alike should 
be aware of the sweeping implications of MikLin, including the distinct pos-
sibility that the United States Supreme Court will definitively resolve these 





163. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 821-22. 
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